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In this paper I present a theory of the boundary of the ﬁrm that accounts for some
important characteristics of real-world multidivisional ﬁrms: Operative decisions are in
the hands of middle managers who are rewarded with incentive contracts based on the
performance of their units; Managers’ decisions are subject to approval and intervention
by the top management of the ﬁrm; and managers are better informed regarding the
aﬀairs of their divisions than their superiors in the ﬁrm’s hierarchy. In this setup, the
integration of a producer of an intermediate input and its buyer as separate divisions
within a single ﬁrm is unambiguously desirable, as long as the choice of trading part-
ners can be credibly delegated to the divisions’ managers. I show that this is satisﬁed
not only under the assumption of full commitment by the general oﬃce of the ﬁrm,
but also interestingly, if it has no commitment power at all. At the time of trade,
the uninformed general oﬃce prefers to delegate the choice of trading partners to the
divisions whose decision is ex-post optimal. An explanation of the boundaries of the
ﬁrm emerges only if we assume that the general oﬃce retains some limited commitment
power. The general oﬃce may then mandate internal trade in order to encourage the
divisions to specialize towards one another before the trade. In the context examined,
I show that the general oﬃce faces a ’time-consistency’ problem. It tends to mandate
internal trades in more instances than would have been optimal with full commitment,
adversely aﬀecting the levels of investment taken by the divisions’ managers. When-
ever such inconsistency arises, it may be optimal to have the trade conducted between
independent, non-integrated parties.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economists have been intrigued with the question of the boundary of the ﬁrm ever since
Coase’s (1937) seminal paper. Following the work of Williamson (1975, 1985), Klein, Craw-
ford and Alchian (1978) and others, the discussion has focused on the diﬃculties of market
transactions when the contracting environment is incomplete. Integrating successive pro-
duction stages within the conﬁnes of a single ﬁrm was perceived to alleviate some of these
costs, reducing opportunistic behavior and minimizing ex-post holdups. These beneﬁts are
to be weighed against the increased governance costs of managing a larger organization.
Drawing on these informal ideas, modern theories of the ﬁrm emphasize the critical
role that the change in the control of ﬁrms’ assets due to integration has on the decisions
taken by stakeholders within ﬁrms. In the prominent Property Rights Theory of the Firm
(Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) ), the joint surplus from trade is
divided between the participants by ex-post negotiations. By transferring ownership of
all physical assets essential for the trade into the hands of the acquiring ﬁrm’s owner,
integration changes the bargaining outcomes. Consequently the parties willingness to make
ex-ante trade-speciﬁc investments is aﬀected in opposite directions. The costs and beneﬁts
of integration are thus clearly identiﬁed, and an explanation of ﬁrms’ boundaries emerges,
alluding to such factors as the marginal importance of the parties’ investments and the
degree of complementarity between the assets. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), building
on Williamson’s ideas, present a model of integration in which the main determinant of
the boundary are measurement costs. Here again integration matters as it fundamentally
changes the incentives of managers who are no longer owners. In this case the incentives
are for activities that are hard to measure such as asset maintenance and proper utilization.
While the work described above has been fundamental in shaping our thinking on these
issues, these models are more suited to study the implications of the acquisition of an
entrepreneurial small ﬁrm than to analyze a merger between two large public ﬁrms into a
multidivisional entity.1 The reason is that these models do not distinguish between the own-
ership and management of ﬁrms which are taken to be in the hands of the same individual.
In most modern enterprises on the contrary, the control of many of the operative decisions is
in the hands of managers who act as agents of a diﬀuse set of owners and hold only a negligi-
ble stake of the ﬁrm. Managers have only limited bargaining power and their compensation
is primarily determined by monetary incentives speciﬁed contractually, and is not directly
tied to the set of assets owned by the ﬁrm. As a result the forces identiﬁed in the models
1See also Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) for a discussion of related issues.
2above do not directly apply in these environments. The fundamental change brought by
integration is to place the two trading stages under a uniﬁed management structure, where
they are controlled and managed through the ﬁrm’s hierarchy.2 As described by Chandler
(1962), many large ﬁrms came to be organized in a multidivisional structure, distinguished
by the delegation of most operating decisions to the managers of semi-autonomous divi-
sions whose decisions are supervised and coordinated by a general oﬃce. For this reason,
the direction of integration, that plays an important role in the Property Rights model, is
no longer as relevant, since either forward or backward integration would result in a similar
ﬁnal structure.
In this paper, I use a model of internal trade within an hierarchal structure to develop a
theory of the ﬁrm’s boundary for such environments. A main diﬀerence between integration
and non-integration in this setting, is in the objective of the common principal, the general
oﬃce of the ﬁrm. Controlling both trading units, the general oﬃce may be inclined to change
managerial compensation and to intervene in the decisions taken by division managers.
Speciﬁcally, the general oﬃce may limit the divisions’ sourcing autonomy and mandate
trade within the ﬁrm. As was documented by Eccles (1985), ﬁrms vary substantially in this
respect. In his study of transfer price practices of large multidivisional ﬁrms, mandated
transactions were quite common, but in other ﬁrms, divisions were given broad autonomy
to choose external partners, even when viable internal alternatives existed. General oﬃces
have even sometimes employed diﬀerent policies with respect to diﬀerent inputs traded
between divisions in the ﬁrm.
Within this framework, I identify the general oﬃce’s ability to credibly delegate the
choice of trading partners to the divisions as central to an explanation of ﬁrms’ boundaries.
Under the incomplete contracts paradigm, maintaining the divisions’ option to trade for
inputs outside the ﬁrm is valuable as it prompts general investments (such as in quality)
by the divisions’ managers. Integration is always desirable as long as divisional sourcing
autonomy can be sustained, yet the general oﬃce may be inclined to limit it if the divisions
decisions do not comply with the corporation best interest. In section 2, I consider a simple
model where in the absence of commitment to divisional sourcing autonomy, and if internal
t r a d ei sa l w a y se ﬃcient, the incentives of divisions’ managers to invest are severely impaired
under integration. Surprisingly however, if external trade may be eﬃcient, even only in
extreme circumstances, and provided that the values of diﬀerent trades are observed only
by divisions’ managers, the general oﬃce ﬁnds it optimal to let the divisions choose their
2On this, see the discussion in Williamson (2000).
3trading partners. This setting does not oﬀer a theory of vertical integration as integration
always outperforms nonintegration even if ex-ante commitment is not feasible.
In order to explain the boundary I turn next to consider a richer environment. I employ
and build on a framework by Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) who study the use of alternative
transfer pricing policies within an integrated ﬁrm. In their model, division managers make
general investments as but also decide on how much to specialize their divisions’ production
towards each other. If divisions are allowed to trade externally, investments are high, but
the divisions do not specialize suﬃciently, each trying to opportunistically increase its share
of the gains from trade.
Section 3 presents a general model which extends Holmstrom and Tirole’s framework
to allow for external trade to be eﬃcient at times, and posits that the ranking of diﬀerent
trading relations is known only to the divisions’ managers, not to the general oﬃce. These
plausible assumptions were demonstrated to be important in the context of the simpler
model of section 2. In section 4, I show that if full commitment to a divisional sourc-
ing autonomy is feasible, integration always dominates nonintegration. The advantage of
integration, as identiﬁed by Holmstrom and Tirole, is in the ”coordination” of incentives
between the managers. Under common ownership, the eﬀect of an increase in a division’s
investment on the proﬁts of the entire ﬁrm is internalized and incentives are adjusted ac-
cordingly. In section 5, I consider the case of no commitment. I analyze a particular model
of bargaining between the divisions and demonstrate that the intuition of the simpler model
generalizes to this setting, and integration always outperforms nonintegration. I conclude
that limited, but less than full commitment power by the general oﬃce is necessary to
explain ﬁrms’ boundaries in this framework.
In section 6 , I then study a particular form of limited commitment, assuming that
the general oﬃce is unable to commit ex-ante (before investments are taken) but only in
an interim stage, before the decisions determining the exact speciﬁcations of the trade
are made. I show that the general oﬃce faces a ”time inconsistency” problem: since in
the interim stage it no longer takes into account the eﬀect on investments that are already
sunk, it tends to mandate internal trade in too many instances compared to what is optimal
ex-ante. The divisions anticipate this equilibrium behavior, and lower their investments
as a result. Nonintegration may be an optimal organizational form in situations where
the integrated ﬁrm suﬀers from such inconsistency. I also show that the asymmetry of
information between the general oﬃce and the divisions regarding the value of external
trade opportunities implies that any choice of transfer pricing policy within an integrated
4ﬁrm results in some trading ineﬃciency. In section 7, I consider how various changes in the
environment, including the relative attractiveness of external opportunities and the degree
of cooperativeness of investments aﬀect the optimal organizational form. In section 8, I
investigate whether the ﬁndings of the previous section still hold if the general oﬃce can
use elaborate mechanisms in order to extract the divisions’ information on the value of
diﬀerent trades. I show that the essence of the results is retained and that the possibility
of using such mechanisms can adversely aﬀect the incentives of the divisions to invest, and
is therefore potentially harmful. Section 9 concludes.
2P r o l o g u e
How does trade between two units within the hierarchial structure of an integrated ﬁrm
diﬀer from that between two independent ﬁrms? I argue that within the conﬁnes of an
integrated ﬁrm, the units can no longer threaten to opt out of an eﬃcient internal trading
relationship, as the general oﬃce of the ﬁrm may not allow it. This limits the role that
information from external markets can play in monitoring the performance of the units, and
has an adverse eﬀect on the investments made by them, lowering the overall eﬃciency of the
integrated organization. A safeguard against such intervention is the fact that internal trade
may not always be eﬃcient, and the units are typically better informed than the general
oﬃce with respect to the values of diﬀerent trades. This tends to discourage intervention
and restore incentives to invest.
In this section, I demonstrate these ideas using a simple model in the spirit of Hart
(1995). The purpose here is mainly expository, and the analysis is therefore not intended to
be rigorous. Consider a trading relation between two units, a buying unit B and a selling
unit S. The units can trade a single unit of input that is to be used by B. Each unit is
headed by an employee-manager. Prior to the trading period, each manager can take an
investment that would increase the value of trade. Let v(b) denote the value to the buying
unit B given an investment of b,w h e r ev0 > 0,v00 ≤ 0. Let c(s) denote the cost to the
selling unit S g i v e na ni n v e s t m e n ts,w h e r ec0 < 0,c 00 ≥ 0. Investment cost is privately
borne by the managers. Both B and S have alternative trading opportunities, the best of
which yield ωB (b,θ)a n dωS (s,θ) respectively. The values of those trades increase with
investment as well, subject to decreasing returns. Hence ∂ωB
∂b > 0, ∂2ωB
∂b2 ≤ 0a n d∂ωs
∂s > 0,
∂2ωs
∂s2 ≤ 0. External trading opportunities’ values also depend on a realization of a random
variable θ which is observed by both managers before the investment decision. Managers
receive monetary compensation based on their unit’s proﬁt αi + βiπi, i ∈ {B,S} where πi
5is unit i’s proﬁt. Their utilities are UB = αB +βBπB − b and US = αS +βSπS − s,w h e r e
πB = v(b) − t if B and S trade with each other, t is the transfer price, and πB = ωB (b)
if the parties trade elsewhere. Similarly πS = t − c(s) if they trade with each other and
πS = ωS (s) if trading elsewhere.
We compare two alternative forms of organizing the trading relation. Under noninte-
gration, the two units are independent ﬁrms, whereas in an integrated relation the units
are divisions within a single ﬁrm. Unlike in Hart’s model, the ownership of assets plays no
role here, as managers are employees both under integration and non-integration. However,
I maintain Hart’s assumption that describing contractually the exact nature of the input
that would be required by B is prohibitive costly, and therefore no contract is signed be-
fore investments are made. At the time of trade, the units bargain over the transfer price.
External trade opportunities aﬀect the division of the gains from trade between the units
in the bargaining, and hence the investment decisions taken prior to the trade.
Consider ﬁrst the case where internal trade is always eﬃcient. Assume
v(b) − c(s) ≥ ωB (b,θ)+ωS (s,θ),∀(b,s,θ).
When B and S are two independent ﬁrms, assume, as in Hart, that the transfer price splits
the surplus over the external trade payoﬀs. The proﬁts to the units are then
πB = ωB (b,θ)+
1
2
[v(b) − c(s) − (ωB (b,θ)+ωS (s,θ))] ,
πS = ωS (s,θ)+
1
2

















Now consider a similar trading relation within the conﬁnes of an integrated ﬁrm. Divisions
are supervised by the general oﬃce of the ﬁrm, who is allocated all the control rights and has
the last say over decisions. Assume that the general oﬃce observes neither the investments
made by the divisions, nor θ. The general oﬃce hence does not know the exact values of
respective trades, and the division managers are allowed to bargain over the transfer price.
Given our assumption that internal trade is always eﬃcient however, the general oﬃce does
know the ranking of diﬀerent trades.
6T r a d ei sa l w a y se ﬃcient and therefore internal. If the general oﬃce could have commit-
ted itself to let the divisions bargain freely and trade externally if they choose to do so, then
investments levels would be as in a non-integrated relation, provided that managerial incen-
tives, βB,βS are the same as under nonintegration. In fact, as will be shown below for the
more general model, the general oﬃce sets stronger incentives for the divisions than those
chosen by independent owners. As a result integration would outperform nonintegration.
Things are very diﬀerent if the general oﬃce cannot credibly commit ahead of time not
to intervene. Because internal trade is commonly known to be always eﬃcient, the general
oﬃce would not allow the divisions to opt out of jointly proﬁtable internal trade. A threat
by one of the units to opt out and trade externally is no longer credible. Even though
opting out may only occur oﬀ the equilibrium path, the possibility of trading externally
has a positive eﬀect on the incentives of the divisions to invest. With no credible option to
trade externally, optimal investments solve












Compared with the investments derived under nonintegration, we note that holding incen-
tives ﬁxed across organizational forms, both investments are lower under integration. This
contrasts with the result in Hart’s model, where under integration, one unit’s investment is
higher, and the other is lower than their levels under nonintegration.
In this setting, the boundaries of ﬁrms can be explained by a trade-oﬀ between two
conﬂicting eﬀects. On one hand, under integration higher—powered incentives are set for
the units, but the level of investment chosen is lower for any given level of incentives. The
relative eﬃciency of integration and nonintegration then depends on the magnitudes of the
two eﬀects. This is however somewhat misleading. As we now show, this result only holds
under the assumption that external trade is never eﬃcient. It is then in the interest of the
general oﬃce to intervene whenever one of the parties choose to opt out. This assumption
does not seem very plausible, as it is reasonable to believe that external trading options may
be superior at least in some extreme situations. If external trade is sometimes eﬃcient, the
general oﬃce cannot rank the respective trades and it will not necessarily prevent opting
out. Hence we assume instead that either internal or external trade can be eﬃc i e n ta tt i m e s :
∀(b,s),∃θ,s.t ωB (b,θ)+ωS (s,θ) ≥ v(b) − c(s).
I now sketch the intuition why in this case the general oﬃce would not intervene, even if it
7cannot commit itself to do so: Bargaining between the divisions always results in an eﬃcient
trade.3 In equilibrium, the divisions opt out if and only if ωB (b,θ)+ωS (s,θ) >v(b)−c(s).
Whenever this is satisﬁed, a transfer price t exists such that v(b) − t ≥ ωB (b,θ)a n d
t − c(s) ≥ ωS (s,θ), and no such price exists otherwise. The general oﬃce observes neither
θ nor the investments, and its information set therefore does not distinguish when internal
trade is optimal. Given that in equilibrium the trading decision is eﬃcient, it is optimal for
the general oﬃce not to overrule the divisions’ decisions to opt out. But then the external
trade opportunities are again viable as outside options, as the divisions can credibly threaten
to opt out. Investments are once again responsive to the returns due to external trading
options, and equal those achieved if full commitment is feasible. An immediate implication
is therefore that integration necessarily dominates nonintegration in this setting.
This simple framework demonstrates that a potential drawback of internalizing trade
within the hierarchial structure of an integrated ﬁrm is that the possibility of discretionary
intervention by the general oﬃc ew o u l dh a v ea na d v e r s ee ﬀect on the investment decisions
taken by the subordinate managers. It is also shown that asymmetric information within the
integrated ﬁrm’s hierarchy regarding the ranking of diﬀerent trades helps to discourage such
intervention, and restore the investment incentives of the managers. These two themes are
central in the analysis below. The simple framework is limited for explaining variation in the
vertical structure of ﬁrms, since as long as external trade is sometimes optimal, integration
dominates nonintegration. I now turn to consider a more complex model in which giving
the units autonomy over the trading decision bears a real cost. In this context, the problem
of the general oﬃce’s inability to commit not to intervene reappears. In section 5 below,
I consider a similar setup to that of this section in the context of the general model, and
provide a more rigorous treatment.
3 The Model
The model is based on the framework of Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) (henceforth HT).4 I
study the organization of trade between a selling unit i = 1 and a buying unit i =2 .T h e
3It is important to stress that the division managers bargain over the transfer price and cannot use
their resources to contract secretly between themselves. If secret side payments between the managers are
possible, then unless βB = βS, the trading decision need not be eﬃcient. Suppose that βB >β S and that
v − c =1 3 ,ωB =1 0a n dωS = 4. In that case external trade is eﬃcient. However by transferring all proﬁts
from internal trade to B using a transfer price of t = c a n dt h e nh a v i n gB secretly pay S,t h ed i v i s i o n s




4The model corresponds to their example 2. They also allow for monetary investment in quality and
cost-reducing eﬀort, which I do not consider here.
8units may trade a single unit of intermediate product that would be used by the buying
unit. Each unit is headed by an employee manager, whose incentives are determined by
contract. There are two possible forms of organization: Under a nonintegrated relationship
the units are independent and separately owned ﬁrms. The integrated ﬁrm is organized in
a multidivisional form and each one of the units functions as a separate division. Divisions’
managers respond to a general oﬃce, who has formal authority over all decisions.5 Each
division is capable of trading with external customers and suppliers without the assistance
of other units being required.
Decision Variables and the Values of Alternative Trades
Each manager controls the level of two variables: a quality-enhancing eﬀort si which
increases the values of both the division’s internal and external trade opportunities, and the
market orientation of its operation mi ∈ [m,m] which determines their relative values. The
cost of quality, c(si), is borne by the manager, measured in monetary terms and strictly
convex. A higher level of m1 increases the value of the intermediate input to external
costumers but at a cost of a decrease in its specialization to unit 2’s needs. A higher level
of m2 raises the value to unit 2 of using substitute inputs from external suppliers but at
t h es a m et i m el o w e r st h ev a l u eo fu s i n gu n i t1 ’ si n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d . T h u smi bears an
opportunity cost, lowering the value of internal trade, but no direct cost to the manager.
The choices made by the managers are not observed by the owners of the units. Following
HT, I simplify the exposition by taking the units to be symmetric in cost and beneﬁts.
Denote by Φ(s1,m 1)+Φ(s2,m 2) the value of trade between the two units, where Φ(si,m i)
is the value added by unit i if the units trade together (I will refer to this as internal trade,
though in the nonintegrated case it should be thought of as mutual trade). Denote by
Γ(si,m i,θ) the value of division i’s best external trading alternative. The value of external




. θ is distributed
according to a continuous distribution with density f (θ).
Due to the incompleteness of contracts, the intermediate good cannot be described in
a contract before investment decisions are made. The state variable θ and the values of
the possible trades are observed later by both units’ managers, but are not observed, nor
veriﬁable by any third party, including the general oﬃce of the integrated ﬁrm.
5We take the general oﬃce’s objective to be maximization of the owners’ surplus. We hence ignore a
second tier of agency relations between the general oﬃce and the ﬁrms’ owners (stockholders). Bolton and
Scharfstein (1998) emphasize the importance of considering explicitly this two-tier agency relation.
9I make the following functional form assumptions on Φ and Γ. Those assumptions are
similar to the ones made by HT, extended to the case of uncertain external trade.
Assumption 1
1. Φ(s,m)=s ∗ x(m,k) where xm < 0,x mm ≤ 0,x k ≤ 0,x mk ≤ 0, x(m,k)=1 , ∀k
and x(m,k)=1 , ∀m.
2. Γ(s,m,θ)=s ∗ γ (m,θ) where γm > 0,γ mm ≤ 0,γ θ > 0,γ mθ ≥ 0.




. k measures the degree to which
the value of internal value depreciates with an increase in the market orientation of each
unit. Both the opportunity cost and the marginal cost of market orientation increase with





≥ Φ(s,m) and Φ(s,m) ≥ Γ(s,m,θ). External trade can be
more or less proﬁtable than internal trade.
In an integrated ﬁrm, the general oﬃce can choose one of two transfer pricing policies:
exchange autonomy or mandated internal trade.6 Under the ﬁrst policy the decision whether
to trade with the internal partner or externally is delegated to the division managers. Under
the latter the divisions are obliged to trade with one another or not at all, but are free to
bargain over the transfer price and whether to trade.
Incentives and Preferences
Unit i ∈ {1,2}’s recorded proﬁts πi are a noisy measure of the actual proﬁts. I assume that
πi = πi + εi,
where εi ∼ N
¡
0,σ2¢
is additive random noise, and πi actual proﬁts. Unit managers are
compensated with a linear wage contract, based on the unit’s proﬁts πi,7
wi = ai + biπi,
6This terminology follows Eccles (1985). Eccles distinguishes between mandated cost-based methods,
where the transfer price is based either on actual costs or standard costs (budgeted costs), and mandated
price-based ones. This distinction does not exist here as we assume that such variables are not veriﬁable to
the general oﬃce, and transfer price is therefore negotiated even if trade is mandated.
7There are some good reasons why less restrictive compensation schemes, including proﬁts h a r i n ga r -
rangements, may not be practical. See Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) for a detailed discussion.
10where ai is a base salary and bi a bonus (or a piece rate) over proﬁts. Managers are
risk-averse, with mean-variance preferences:8
Ui = Ewi − rVar(wi) − c(si).
Each manager’s reservation utility is U. I assume that the risk due to θ is unsystematic
and can therefore be fully diversiﬁed by the manager, but that the risk associated with εi is
not. Therefore only the uncertainty due to εi enters the variance term above, which equals
b2
iσ2.9 Finally we assume that the general oﬃce of an integrated ﬁrm maximizes the return
to the ﬁrm’s owners.
Timing
The sequence of events is depicted in Figure 1:
  Wage contracts 
determined  θ realized 
Bargaining over trade 
Profits realized 
Ex-post 
(s1,s2)  (m1,m2) 
Interim Ex-ante 
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
Contractual arrangements with the managers are made at the beginning of the employment
relation. One can think of the investments si as representing a non-contractible investment
in divisional-speciﬁc know-how over a long period of product development. The market
8If managers preferences are represented by a CARA utility, given the linearity of wages and the additive
normal noise, utility can be represented in this mean-variance form. See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).
9Addressing the risk due to external trading value directly would unnecessarily complicate the model
without any clear payoﬀ. Risk aversion establishes a cost of incentives, so that the level of incentives
may vary across organizational forms. Alternatively,o n ec a na s s u m er i s kn e u t r a l ity, and introduce a cost
of incentives through other means, for example by having the performance measure depend on random
variables that are unobserved at the time the contract is signed but revealed only to the agent before the
choice of eﬀort level, as in Baker (1992).
11orientation decision mi is taken later, closer to the date of trade, and after the realization
of θ. I identify three time periods: the ex-ante stage, when incentive schemes for the units
managers are determined; the interim stage, after the choice of si and the realization of
θ but before the decision on mi;a n dt h eex-post stage, following the decision on mi and
throughout the bargaining stage. I have not yet indicated the time at which the general
oﬃce in an integrated ﬁrm chooses a transfer pricing policy. The timing of this decision
turns out to be critical. I will discuss it in detail beginning in section 4.
Bargaining over the Transfer Price
At the ex-post stage, the units bargain over the transfer price t to be paid from unit 2 to
unit 1. If they trade together, the gain from trade Φ(s1,m 1)+Φ(s2,m 2)n e to ft h et r a n s f e r
price is recorded as proﬁt for unit 2, and the transfer price is recorded as unit 1’s proﬁt.
Bargaining yields an eﬃcient trading rule given (s1,m 1,s2,m 2,θ). Under trade between the
units, the transfer price splits the surplus over the disagreement proﬁts equally. In a non-
integrated relationship and in an integrated ﬁrm under a policy of exchange autonomy, units
are free to trade externally and the disagreement payoﬀsa r eΓ(si,m i,θ)f o ri ∈ {1,2}. The
units trade with one another if and only if Φ(s1,m 1)+Φ(s2,m 2) ≥ Γ(s1,m 1,θ)+Γ(s2,m 2,θ).
If the divisions of an integrated ﬁrm are mandated to trade internally, the disagreement
payoﬀs equal the value of no-trade.
Under non-integration (NI) and integration+exchange autonomy (E) the transfer price
is therefore determined as follows:
Φ(s1,m 1)+Φ(s2,m 2) − t − Γ(s2,m 2,θ)=t − Γ(s1,m 1,θ).
Unit i ∈ {1,2}’s actual proﬁti st h e n
πi (si,m i,s j,m j,θ)=
(
Γ(si,mi,θ)+Φ(si,mi)+Φ(sj,mj)−Γ(sj,mj,θ)
2 if internal trade is eﬃcient
Γ(si,m i,θ) if external trade is eﬃcient
(1)





and unit i ∈ {1,2}’s actual proﬁti s




12I now proceed to the analysis of the game and consider three alternative behavioral
assumptions regarding the use of transfer pricing policy in an integrated ﬁrm: First, I
assume that the transfer pricing policy can be publicly announced and committed to ex-ante,
before any investment decisions by the divisions. Following the announcement the general
oﬃce refrains from any intervention, and the divisions comply with the announced policy.
Second, I assume that no commitment is possible, and the general oﬃce may intervene in
the ex-post bargaining. Finally, I consider a case where commitment is not possible ex-ante
but is possible interim, after the quality-enhancing investments are sunk but before the
decisions over market orientation are taken.
4 Ex-ante Commitment to a Transfer Pricing Policy
Suppose that the general oﬃce of an integrated ﬁrm can make a public commitment to a
transfer pricing policy at the ex-ante stage, before any investment is made by the managers.
This is the case considered in HT. Under this assumption, the integrated organization always
weakly dominates the non-integration relation. The integrated ﬁrm can always commit to
an exchange autonomy policy, and replicate the non-integrative structure. Furthermore, as
HT establish, and as is shown in section 6 below for this model, division managers within an
integrated ﬁrm receive more powered incentives, as the ﬁrm internalizes the full impact of
an increase in a division’s quality investment on proﬁts. This implies that under exchange
autonomy, an integrated ﬁrm would do better than independent ﬁrms. The integrated ﬁrm
may do even better than this by committing to a mandated internal trade policy, spurring
the divisions to specialize more closely towards one another whenever trading internally.
There are several reasons to doubt that such commitment is possible in organizations.
As documented in Eccles (1985), ﬁrms tend to change transfer pricing policies over time,
as external circumstances change and due to internal politics. The fact that the top man-
agement of organization changes over time may imply that the current management may
not feel bound by a policy adopted by previous management. Also, large multidivisional
corporations tend to employ several transfer pricing policies for diﬀerent trades within the
ﬁrm, making an early commitment less plausible.
5 N oC o m m i t m e n tt oaT r a n s f e rP r i c i n gP o l i c y
Suppose now that the general oﬃce of an integrated ﬁrm is unable to commit to a transfer
pricing policy throughout the ex-ante and interim stages. Any early announcement of a
13transfer pricing policy can be ignored at no co s tw h e nt h et i m et ot r a d ea r r i v e s .T h eg e n e r a l
oﬃce can therefore intervene in the bargaining between the two divisions, and dictate both
the identity of the trading partners and the transfer price for internal trade. In order to
analyze the implications for the comparison between organizational forms, a model of the
bargaining between the divisions subject to the possibility of discretionary intervention by
the general oﬃce is required. Consider ﬁrst the following one-stage bargaining procedure,
without the possibility of intervention:
• With probability 1
2, each one of the units is chosen to oﬀer a division of internal gains
from trade Φi + Φj,w h e r eΦk = Φ(sk,m k), k ∈ {1,2}. We denote the proposer by i,
and the oﬀer by z =( zi,z j) ∈ R2
+, such that zi + zj = Φi + Φj.
• Unit j then responds to i’s oﬀer. If it accepts, then the units trade with each other
and the gains of trade are divided according to z. If it rejects the oﬀer, the units trade
externally and each unit k ∈ {1,2} gets Γk = Γ(sk,m k,θ). Denote j’s response by
r(z) ∈ {Y,N}.
Unit k ∈ {1,2}’s preferences are given by Ui = bkπk. Such bargaining procedure corresponds
to the non-integrated relation. One can verify the following result:
Lemma 1 The bargaining game without possibility of intervention has a unique family of
subgame perfect equilibria: z∗ =( Φi + Φj − Γj,Γj) if internal trade is eﬃcient and any
oﬀer with z∗
i ≥ Γi otherwise, and r∗
j (z)=Y if and only if zj ≥ Γj. The expected proﬁts for
unit k ∈ {1,2} in any equilibrium are
E [πk]=
½
Γk if external trade is eﬃcient
1
2Γk + 1
2 (Φk + Φ−k − Γ−k)=
Φk+Φ−k+Γk−Γ−k
2 if internal trade is eﬃcient
Thus under nonintegration, the bargaining results in an eﬃcient trade, and a split (in
expectation) of the surplus over the external trade payoﬀs when trade is internal.
Next consider an integrated setting, where we allow for an intervention by the general
oﬃce of the integrated ﬁrm, G. We modify the bargaining procedure above as follows:
• If unit j rejects unit i’s oﬀer, the general oﬃce can intervene and force unit j to accept
it. If the general oﬃce does not intervene then the units trade externally. Denote by
g(z,r(z)) ∈ {0,1} the general oﬃce decision where g = 0 implies no-intervention.
The general oﬃce preferences are given by UG =( 1 − b1)π1 +( 1− b2)π2.W e r e s t r i c t
attention to the symmetric case b1 = b2 = b and hence UG =( 1− b)(π1 + π2). The general
14oﬃce has not observed θ, and it holds a prior f (θ) over its distribution. It also has not
observed the previous choices of (s1,s 2,m 1,m 2).
Suppose ﬁrst, as is assumed in HT, that internal trade is always eﬃcient. That is,
∀(s1,s 2,m 1,m 2,θ), Φ1 + Φ2 > Γ1 + Γ2. We can then show the following:
Lemma 2 If internal trade is always eﬃcient, then in every weak perfect baysian equilib-
rium (PBE) of the bargaining game with intervention, g(z,N)=1and z =( Φ1 + Φ2,0).
The general oﬃce always mandates internal trade if no agreement is reached by the divi-
sions. The proposer claims all the gains from trade to itself. The expected proﬁts of unit










Proof. As internal trade is always eﬃcient, it maximizes joint proﬁts and therefore
given G’s preferences above, internal trade is always mandated by the general oﬃce if unit
j rejects the oﬀer. Given that behavior, it is optimal for unit i to ask for the entire surplus
for itself.
The bargaining splits the surplus over the no-trade payoﬀs. The values of external
trading opportunities have no eﬀect on the divisions’ proﬁts. Although the general oﬃce
does not actually observe the exact values of diﬀerent trades, it is still able to rank them, and
as a result, it intervenes whenever a non-eﬃcient external trade would take place. Though
this happens only oﬀ the equilibrium path, the result is that external trade opportunities
can no longer play a ”monitoring” role, and therefore have no eﬀect on the investment
decisions of the divisions. The divisions’ behavior would be identical to that in the case
where internal trade is mandated ex-ante.
Now suppose as in assumption 2, that either internal or external trade may be eﬃcient.
As the next lemma shows, the bargaining game then has an equilibrium which yields an
eﬃcient trade and a split of the surplus over external trade payoﬀs when internal trade is
eﬃcient.
Lemma 3 Under assumption 2, the following is a weak PBE of the game, in which trade is
eﬃcient: z∗ =( Φi + Φj − Γj,Γj) if Φi+Φj > Γi+Γj and any oﬀer with z∗
i ≥ Γi otherwise.
r∗ (z)=Y if and only if zj ≥ Γj,a n dg (z,N)=0for every z.
Proof. Given the equilibrium behavior of the units, the general oﬃce believes that
with probability one external trade is eﬃcient whenever j opts out, and therefore ﬁnds it
15optimal not to intervene. As the general oﬃce never intervenes, the equilibrium behavior
of the units is optimal.
In the equilibrium described above, the general oﬃce does not intervene in the bargaining
procedure. Whenever the divisions choose to trade externally, the general oﬃce believes
that external trade is eﬃcient and refrains from intervening. The expected proﬁts to the
units are as in the case of bargaining without intervention.10
It is useful to interpret this result using the concepts of ”real” and ”formal” authority
(Aghion and Tirole (1997)). The general oﬃce of an integrated ﬁrm retains formal authority
over all of the decisions regarding the trade. However, when the divisions are better informed
than the general oﬃce on the ranking of diﬀerent trades, the general oﬃce can credibly
transfer real authority over the choice of trading partners to the units.
Even though we analyze a special bargaining procedure, the insights seem to be shared
with other bargaining procedures, provided that the choice of trading externally is irre-
versible and ﬁnal. An alternating oﬀers game with external trade options playing the role
of ”outside options” (as in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)) is likely to give a similar result.11
To conclude, when commitment to a transfer pricing policy is infeasible, and under
assumption 2, the divisions would be given autonomy to decide on their trading partners.
Holding incentives ﬁxed at the levels of nonintegrated relation, the divisions investments
(s1,s 2), interim decisions (m1,m2)a n dt h e i rp r o ﬁts under integration would equal those
under nonintegrated relation. By the same reasoning of the last section, integration then
dominates non-integration, as incentives can be coordinated. Because internal trade is
never mandated, the joint surplus under no-commitment can be lower than under ex-ante
commitment.
6 Interim Commitment to a Transfer Pricing Policy
The two polar assumptions on the commitment ”technology” considered above imply that
integration always weakly dominates nonintegration. As such they are a limited basis for a
10The bargaining game has several other equilibria in which the general oﬃce intervenes, either on or oﬀ
the equilibria path. For example, if we assume that Ef [Γi + Γj] < Φi + Φj, and that Φi + Φj > Γi for all
(si,m i,s j,m j,θ), then the following is a weak PBE:
• z
∗ =( Φi + Φj,0), r
∗ (z)=Y if and only if zj ≥ 0a n dg(z,N) = 1 for every z. The general oﬃce
belief following (z,N) equals its prior belief.
The trade in this equilibrium however is ineﬃcient as the units never trade externally. The eﬃciency of the
non-intervention equilibrium renders it more plausible then other equilibria which result in some ineﬃcient
trades.
11Though not a split-the-surplus rule.
16positive theory of ﬁrms’ boundaries. Under no-commitment the model also fails to explain
the observed use of mandated internal trade. I now consider an intermediate form of
commitment, assuming that the general oﬃce cannot commit ex-ante to a transfer pricing
policy but can commit at the interim stage once quality-enhancing investment si has been
sunk, but before mi has been taken.
The proximity between the announcement of the transfer pricing policy and actual trade
suggests that this form of limited commitment is more plausible then ex-ante commitment.
For one reason, management is less likely to change in this time period. Also, some level
of commitment is available, as we observe mandated internal trade between divisions.12 In
the remaining analysis, I therefore maintain the assumption of interim commitment.
6.1 Choice of Market Orientation
Proceeding backwards, I consider ﬁrst the interim choice of market orientation mi,g i v e n
investments (s1,s 2) and a realization of θ. Our assumptions on the bargaining imply that the
units expect to trade eﬃciently given (s1,s 2,θ) and their decisions on (m1,m 2). Consider
now the choice of (m1,m 2) given each of the organizational forms:
Integration + Mandated Internal trade
Mandating internal trade eﬀectively implies that mi = m is optimal for i ∈ {1,2}.T h e
equilibrium choices of market orientation are therefore m∗
1 = m∗
2 = m. The total gains from
trade under mandated internal trade, from the point of view of the general oﬃce that does
not observe the realization of θ, are
Φ(s1,m)+Φ(s2,m). (3)
The cost of quality-enhancing eﬀort and the cost of incentives (in terms of risk) which are
already sunk are omitted.
Nonintegration and Integration + Exchange autonomy
12An alternative interpretation of interim commitment is the following. Suppose that the opportunity
cost of market orientation, k, is observed only at the interim period, but that unlike θ it is observed by
everyone in the ﬁrms’ hierarchy. Provided that k can vary substantially, it may be too costly for the general
oﬃce to commit ex-ante to a transfer pricing policy, even if it is within its power. To put it diﬀerently, the
temptation to renege interim on an earlier decision may be too great. To accommodate such an interpretation,
the analysis to follow has to be slightly modiﬁed, but it is conjectured that the essence of the results should
nevertheless hold.










si,m i,s j,m ∗
j,θ
¢¤
− c(si) − r(bi)
2 σ2.
As si and bi are already determined at the interim stage, this is equivalent to a maximization
over πi
³
si,m i,s j,m ∗
j,θ
´
. When the parties trade internally in a continuation equilibrium,
the part of πi that depends on mi can be seen from (1) to be
Γ(si,m i,θ)+Φ(si,m i)
2






By assumption 1, h(m,θ,k)i sc o n c a v ei nm and so hm changes sign at most once on [m,m].
If the choice of mi does not aﬀect whether the trade is internal or not, then the optimal
choice of market orientation given internal trade is:
e m(θ,k) = arg max
mi∈[m,m]
si ∗ h(mi,θ,k). (5)





xmm+γmm ≥ 0. When the discussion does not involve a comparison across k,Iw r i t ee m(θ)
for short, but the dependence in k should not be ignored.
I now characterize the equilibrium choice (m∗
1,m ∗
2)g i v e n( s1,s2) and a realization of θ.
In general, multiple equilibria are possible.
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium of the subgame beginning in the interim stage, (m∗
1,m ∗
2)=
(m,m) if trade is external in the continuation equilibrium, and (m∗
1,m ∗
2)=(e m(θ), e m(θ))
if trade is internal.
Proof. If the units trade externally in the continuation equilibrium then it is clear that
m∗
i = m,∀i ∈ {1,2}. Otherwise each manager can deviate proﬁtably to m while keeping
trade external. Now suppose that in the continuation equilibrium the units trade with one
another. Then m∗
i ≤ e m(θ), ∀i ∈ {1,2} or else a deviation to e m(θ) increases the value
of internal trade and is proﬁtable as e m(θ) is optimal given internal trade. Suppose then
that m∗





2,θ)o re l s e ,a sh(mi,θ,k)i si n c r e a s i n gi nmi for mi ≤ e m(θ), some
small increase in m∗





2,θ). Given the bargaining rule, each unit’s
proﬁt equals its disagreement payoﬀΓ (si,m ∗
i,θ). But then each manager can deviate to
mi = m, guaranteeing himself a payoﬀ of Γ(si,m,θ) at least, and hence a contradiction,
since Γ(si,m,θ) > Γ(si,m ∗
i,θ)g i v e nm∗
i < e m(θ) ≤ m and Γm > 0. Therefore if trade is
internal, m∗
i = e m(θ), ∀i ∈ {1,2}.









b θ(s1,s 2) < e θ(s1,s 2), such that the equilibria of the subgame starting with the choice of
(m1,m 2) are characterized as follows:
1. For θ ∈
h




2)=( e m(θ), e m(θ)) is the unique equilibrium and the
units trade internally.
2. For θ ∈
h
b θ(s1,s 2),e θ(s1,s 2)
i
, there are two pure strategy equilibria: one in which
(m∗
1,m ∗
2)=( m,m) and trade is external, and another where (m∗
1,m ∗
2)=(e m(θ), e m(θ))
and trade is internal.13






2)=( m,m) is the unique equilibrium and the units
trade externally.
Proof. Appendix.
As the next lemma shows, whenever multiple equilibria exist, the equilibrium in which trade
is internal is Pareto-dominant.
Lemma 5 If for (s1,s 2,θ) an equilibrium of the interim subgame with (e m(θ), e m(θ)) and
internal trade exists, then it is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
Proof. By lemma 4, the only other possible equilibrium of the subgame has the units
choose mi = m each and trade externally. As each unit can always unilaterally guarantee
itself at least Γ(si,m,θ), proﬁts under an (e m(θ), e m(θ)) equilibrium has to be at least
Γ(si,m,θ). But these are exactly the proﬁts in an equilibrium with (m,m).
In what follows, I focus on equilibria of the complete game in which a Pareto-dominant
equilibrium is played in the subgame starting with the choice of (m1,m 2). Deﬁne the cutoﬀ
point between internal and external trade under nonintegration and integration+exchange




e m(θ)i f θ ≤ θE (s1,s 2)
m otherwise ,
13There also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium.
19for i ∈ {1,2}.I fs1 = s2 = s,i ti se a s i l yv e r i ﬁed from (20) in the appendix, that θE (s,s)
















≥ h(e m(θ),θ,k)f o r θ ≤ θE.
θE is also a function of k and we denote this explicitly whenever appropriate.
The expected total gains from trade amounts to:
Z θE(s1,s2)
θ





It is instructive to compare the choice of market orientation (m1,m 2)m a d ei na ni n t e -
grated ﬁrm under the two possible transfer pricing policies to the ”ﬁrst best” choices that
would maximize the joint proﬁts.







the ﬁrst-best choices of market orientation — the choice of
(m1,m 2) that would have been chosen were mi contractible and the general oﬃce informed




m if Φ(s1,m)+Φ(s2,m) > Γ(s1,m,θ)+Γ(s2,m,θ),
m Otherwise.
Deﬁne θFB(s1,s 2) as the solution with respect to θ to Φ(s1,m)+Φ(s2,m)=Γ(s1,m,θ)+
Γ(s2,m,θ). Given the multiplicative form of Φ and Γ, θFB(s1,s 2) is independent of (s1,s2).







I now compare the cutoﬀ level θE between internal and external trade under exchange
autonomy to the ﬁrst-best cutoﬀ level θFB deﬁned above.
Lemma 6 For every (s1,s 2), θE (s1,s 2) ≤ θFB.
Proof. ∀(s1,s 2)a n d∀θ ≤ θE (s1,s 2), (e m(θ), e m(θ)) is an equilibrium, and so we know
that
s1γ(m,θ) ≤




s2x(e m(θ),k)+s1x(e m(θ),k)+s2γ (e m(θ),θ) − s1γ(e m(θ),θ)
2
.
20Adding up we get (s1 + s2)γ(m,θ) ≤ (s1 + s2)x(e m(θ),k), and consequentially as x(e m(θ),k) ≤
x(m,k),
(s1 + s2)γ(m,θ) ≤ (s1 + s2)x(m,k),
and hence θ ≤ θFB.T h e r e f o r eθE (s1,s 2) ≤ θFB.
Many of the managers in multidivisional corporations interviewed by Eccles (1985) felt
that whenever an exchange autonomy policy was employed, proﬁtable trading opportunities
within the ﬁrm were foregone, and ”too little” internal trade was taken relative to what
they perceived as optimal. The lemma above shows that indeed exchange autonomy can
lead to ineﬃciently low levels of internal trade. Managers do not specialize enough towards
their internal partners and as a result they ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to trade outside later on.
6.2 Choice of Incentives and Investments
I now turn to the choice of incentives and quality in the ex-ante stage. Consider ﬁrst the
choice of incentives {(ai,b i)}
2






π(si, e m(θ),s j, e m(θ),θ)f (θ)dθ +
θ Z
θE(si,sj)
Γ(si,m,θ)f (θ)dθ − Ewi
subject to










(ii) ai + bi
³R θE(si,sj)




− c(si) − rb2
iσ2 ≥ U
Given the linearity of the wage contract wi, the base salary ai is chosen to satisfy the
manager’s individual rationality constraint with equality. One can then substitute the wage
term into the objective and drop this constraint. Given the functional forms in assumption
































θE(s,sj) s ∗ γ (m,θ)f (θ)dθ − c(s).
In a similar fashion, one derives the program for an integrated ﬁrm. The choice of
incentives in an integrated ﬁrm is conditioned on the transfer pricing policy that would









































θE(s,sj) s ∗ γ (m,θ)f (θ)dθ − c(s), i ∈ {1,2}






















2 f (θ)dθ − c(s), i ∈ {1,2}
Incentives can be seen therefore to maximize the joint gains from trade under the incentive
compatibility constraints.
We restrict attention to a symmetric choice of incentives, b1 = b2 = bj (k)f o rj ∈
{NI,M,E} 14. Given this, there is a continuation equilibrium in which s1 = s2 = sj (k)f o r
j ∈ {NI,M,E}. Under exchange autonomy (E) and non-integration (NI), the investments












=0 j ∈ {NI,E},
14Given the symmetry of the problem, symmetric incentives may be (but are not proved to be here) the
equilbrium choice of incentives when asymmetric incentives are allowed.
22where h(m,θ,k)i sd e ﬁn e di n( 4 ), and θE (s1,s 2) independent of (s1,s 2) given that s1 = s2 =




























































Comparing the programs for non-integration, (8), and exchange autonomy, (9), above,
we note that the choice of si is equal given the same level of incentives, but as x(e m(θ),k) ≥
h(e m(θ),θ,k)f o rθ ≤ θE, the return to an increase in incentives is higher under exchange
autonomy, and so managers receive higher-powered incentives. The common owner inter-
nalizes the full eﬀect that an increase in si has on the gains from internal trade, whereas
the owner of a nonintegrated unit internalizes only one half of that gain plus an additional
smaller part through the increase in external trade value. Other comparisons between
incentives under various regimes, are in general ambiguous.
The total ex-ante expected gains from trade for the various organizational forms are






































(EX) (k)=2 sM (k)
θ R
θ








6.3 Optimal Interim Transfer Pricing Policy in an Integrated Firm
In this section, I consider the problem facing the general oﬃce of an integrated ﬁrm when
it comes to choose a transfer pricing policy in the interim stage. Given that it set up
23divisions’ managers incentives at bi = b for i ∈ {1,2}, the general oﬃce expects them
to invest si = s(b) each. As the actual investments are not observed, the choice between
transfer pricing policies is based on these expected values. Deﬁne the expected gains from
trade at the interim stage, given the diﬀerent transfer pricing policies as follows:
V M















The terms reﬂecting investment costs and incentives’ costs are omitted as they are already
sunk. As argued before, θE does not depend on the investments as s1 = s2.












Each of the transfer pricing policies entail a cost relative to the interim ﬁrst-best. Mandating




. An exchange autonomy




ineﬃcient external trade for θ ∈
£
θE,θFB¤
. The interim decision on a transfer pricing policy
requires a comparison of those costs. It is optimal for the general oﬃce to mandate internal
trade if the expected value of the residual proﬁts under such policy is larger than under
exchange autonomy and vice-versa. Therefore the general oﬃce would mandate internal
trade if and only if 15
∆M(IN) (k) ≡ (1 − b)
³
V M




Given assumption 1, the expression for ∆M(IN) (k) can be written as follows:
∆M(IN) (k)=( 1 − b)
³
V M

















15If the general oﬃce does not commit to any transfer pricing policy at the interim stage, it has eﬀectively
chosen exchange autonomy. See the discussion on no commitment, Section 5.
24The important thing to note is that the sign of ∆M(IN) (k) and therefore the optimal choice
of transfer pricing interim does not depend on b or s.
I now turn to study how ∆M(IN) (k), and correspondingly the optimal interim transfer
pricing policy, varies with k. I make the following additional assumption:
Assumption 3 For every θ and every k , −xm
xmk
xmm+γmm + xk ≤ 0 at m = e m(θ,k).
The total eﬀect of a change in k on x(e m(θ,k),k), and hence on the value of internal




dk + xk. It is composed of a negative
direct eﬀect xk and an indirect eﬀect xm
de m
dk .D i ﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition of (5)
with respect to (m,k)y i e l d sde m
dk = − xmk
xmm+γmm ≤ 0. The assumption states that the direct
eﬀect is stronger than the indirect eﬀect, so that the total eﬀect is negative.




,t h e n ∆M(IN) (k0) ≥ 0, ∀k0 ≥ k .
Proof. V M
(IN) is independent of k, as by assumption 1, x(m,k)=1 , ∀k. Consider then
the eﬀect on V E
(IN). The derivative of
R θE(k)
θ x(e m(θ,k),k)f (θ)dθ +
R θ
θE(k) γ (m,θ)f (θ)dθ





















f (θ)dθ ≤ 0,
given assumption 3.




exists such that a policy of mandated
internal trade is optimal interim if and only if k ≥ k1. If the opportunity cost of market
orientation is not too high, the general oﬃce prefers to allow the divisions to choose their
trading partners themselves so that proﬁtable external trading opportunities would not be
forgone.
6.4 A Comparison to the Optimal Ex-ante Transfer Pricing Policy
The optimal choice of transfer pricing policy at the interim stage does not depend on the
level of quality-enhancing investments (s1,s 2) which are already sunk. If on the other hand
the general oﬃce was able to commit ex-ante to a transfer pricing policy, its decision would
also take into account the eﬀect on those investments. From an ex-ante perspective, the
25total gains from trade under mandated internal trade are higher in expectation than under
exchange autonomy if ∆M(EX) ≥ 0, where:
∆M(EX) (k)=V M
(EX) (k) − V E






















x(e m(θ),k)f (θ)dθ + sE (k)
θ R
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sM (k), sE (k) are the symmetric equilibrium investments in quality given mandated internal
trade and exchange autonomy respectively (deﬁned in (11)), and bM (k),b E (k)a r et h e
optimal incentives. The next proposition shows that as commitment to a transfer pricing
policy is only possible at the interim stage, internal trade is mandated in ”too many” cases
compared to the ex-ante optimum. The reason is that ex-ante the general oﬃce also takes
into account the adverse eﬀect that mandating internal trade has on the investment levels.
Proposition 2 All trades that would have been mandated ex-ante are also mandated in-




, ∆M(EX) (k) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆M(IN) (k) ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose that ∆M(EX) (k) ≥ 0. Denote by sM the symmetric equilibrium quality
investment when exchange autonomy is chosen ex-ante and incentives are set to bM.A sbE







x(e m(θ),k)f (θ)dθ + sE
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x(e m(θ),k)f (θ)dθ + sM
θ R
θE










Therefore as ∆M(EX) = V M
















x(e m(θ),k)f (θ)dθ + sM
θ R
θE





≥ ∆M(EX) ≥ 0,
26where






















By deﬁnition h(e m(θ),θ,k) ≥ h(m,θ,k) ≥
x(m,k)
2 ∀θ,a n d∀θ ≥ θE, γ (m,θ) ≥ x(e m(θ),k) ≥
h(e m(θ),θ,k)i m p l y i n gγ (m,θ) ≥
x(m,k)












and sM ≥ sM as b s0 ≥ 0. Now the function s∗
R θE
θ x(e m(θ),k)f (θ)dθ+s∗
R θ
θE γ (m,θ)f (θ)dθ−
c(s)i sc o n c a v ei ns,a n di sm a x i m i z e da t
s∗ = b s
ÃZ θE
θ






As x(e m(θ),k) ≥ h(e m(θ),θ,k)t h e ns∗ ≥ sM ≥ sM.I t sv a l u ea tsM is therefore higher than


















which implies that ∆M(IN) (k) ≥ 0.
Interim, the general oﬃce mandates trade in all cases (i.e. for all values of k)i tw o u l d
mandate trade ex-ante if able to commit. Note that if θE < θ, then sM >s M, and we
can strengthen the result above and claim that ∆M(EX) (k)=0⇒ ∆M(IN) (k) > 0. This
implies that for values of k at which the general oﬃce is indiﬀerent between transfer pricing
policies ex-ante it strictly prefers to mandate internal trade in the interim stage.
The results of proposition 2 are summarized in the following diagram:
27Exchange Autonomy                                   Mandated Trade





Figure 2: Ex-ante vs. interim optimal policies
6.5 Choice of Organizational Form
A long-standing tradition in the literature on the vertical organization of ﬁr m si st oa s s u m e
that trade is organized in a form that maximizes the joint (ex-ante) gains from trade (see for
example Hart (1995)). In the environment discussed here, the value of the integrated ﬁrm
is constrained because the transfer pricing policy is chosen at an interim stage. Whenever
the ex-ante optimal transfer pricing policy is the same as the interim optimum, integration
must be (at least) weakly optimal. But as demonstrated in proposition 2, the general oﬃce
tends to mandate internal trade in too many instances. In those cases, where exchange
autonomy (E) is optimal ex-ante but mandated internal trade (M) is interim optimal, the
optimal organizational form is found by a comparison of a the total gains from trade under a
non-integrated relationship, V NI
(EX), to that under integration with mandated internal trade,
V M
(EX). The comparison trades oﬀ the advantages of ”coordinating” the incentives of the
two managers (shared by all integrated forms) and of optimal specialization for internal
trades under mandated internal trade, with the advantages of non-integration in terms of
the ﬂexibility to trade externally when proﬁtable, and the improved incentives for quality-
enhancing investment (for a ﬁxed level of incentives). I summarize this as follows:
Lemma 8 Suppose that the organizational form maximizes the ex-ante gains from trade.





1. If V E
(IN) (k) ≥ V M
(IN) (k) then the units would be integrated and be given an exchange
autonomy.
282. If V E
(IN) (k) <VM
(IN) (k) then if V NI
(EX) (k) <VM
(EX) (k) the units would be integrated and
internal trade would be mandated, otherwise the units would be nonintegrated ﬁrms.
Proof.
1. From proposition 2, V E
(IN) (k) ≥ V M
(IN) (k) ⇒ V E
(EX) (k) ≥ V M
(EX) (k). As V E
(EX) (k) ≥
V NI
(EX) (k) for every k, the ex-ante optimum is also the interim optimum and therefore
E is the optimal organizational form.
2. If V E
(IN) (k) <V M
(IN) (k), a transfer policy M w o u l db ec h o s e ni na ni n t e g r a t e dﬁrm
interim and the ex-ante comparison is then between M and NI.
7 Comparative Statics
In this section I study how changes in the trading environment aﬀect the optimal choice
of organizational form. I have already noted in the previous section that the choice of
organizational form depends on the value of k, the opportunity cost of market orientation.
Variation in k may be interpreted in one of two ways: ﬁrst, as cross-sectional diﬀerences
in the specialization of inputs within an industry; second, as intraﬁrm variation between
diﬀerent inputs that are manufactured in-house, with similar implications. Lemma 7 and
proposition 2 together imply that exchange autonomy is optimal both interim and ex-ante
for k<k 1, where k1 is the interim cutoﬀ value between transfer pricing policies, and
therefore integration is necessarily weakly optimal for those values of k. Trades in which
internal value only moderately decrease if the input is not fully specialized, are more likely
to be taken internally within an integrated ﬁrm. In these cases, the divisions would be given
exchange autonomy and allowed to trade externally. If the cost of insuﬃcient specialization
is higher, exchange autonomy would not be sustainable and the production of the input
would either be outsourced to an independent supplier (if the provision of incentives to the
units is more important) or done in-house (if specialization is more important), in which
case internal trade would be mandated. Integrated ﬁrms with very specialized needs (so
that V M
(EX) >VE
(EX)) would mandate internal trade.
7.1 Distribution of external trade opportunities
What is the eﬀect of a favorable change in the distribution of external trade opportunities?
I consider this question for the special case of γ (m,θ)=( m + θ). For this form, as can
29be seen from (5), the choice of orientation, e m(θ,k), is independent of θ.A ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance increase in f (θ) then raises the total gains from trade under non-
integration and integration+exchange autonomy both from an interim, (14), and ex-ante,
(12), perspectives, but has no eﬀect on the gains from trade if internal trade is mandated.16
By lemma 8, there are several possible eﬀects:
1. If V M
(IN) (k) <VE
(IN) (k)b e f o r et h es h i f ti nf (θ), the optimal organizational form both
before and after is integration + exchange autonomy (E).
2. If V E
(IN) (k) <VM
(IN) (k)b e f o r et h es h i f ti nf (θ)a n dV E
(IN) (k) ≥ V M
(IN) (k)a f t e r ,t h e n
if prior to the change V M
(EX) (k) <VNI
(EX) (k) as well, the organization of trade would
change from non-integration (NI) to integration+exchange autonomy (E). If prior
to the change V M
(EX) (k) ≥ V NI
(EX) (k), we would observe a change from M into E.
3. If V E
(IN) (k) <VM
(IN) (k) before and after the shift in f (θ), then by the second part of
lemma 8, the eﬀect is determined by comparing the ex-ante gains from trade between






(EX) (k) >V NI
(EX) (k)b e f o r et h es h i f ta n dV M
(EX) (k) <V NI
(EX) (k) after, the vertical
structure would change from integration to non-integration.
One conclusion that we can draw is that a ﬁrst order stochastic dominance increase
in the distribution of θ results in fewer instances (fewer values of k)f o rw h i c hi n t e g r a -
tion+mandated trade is optimal. But an analysis that ignores the internal organization
of integrated ﬁrms (i.e. the transfer pricing policy) but focuses narrowly on the choice of
vertical structure (integration vs. nonintegration) may ﬁnd no clear eﬀect.
7.2 Cooperativeness of investment
Up to this point, we have limited attention to ”self-investments” in quality: investments by
unit i that increase the value of i’s internal and external trade options, but have no eﬀect
on the value of j’s trade with other partners. The literature on incomplete contracting and
vertical integration (Che and Hausch (1999), Whinston (2003)) has also considered a sec-
ond type of investment, called ”cooperative investment”. An investment by unit i is said to
be cooperative when it increases the value of unit j’s external trading options. An example
of a cooperative investment is a buyer who deploys a team of quality specialists to help a
16For the general case, as
∂ e m
∂θ ≥ 0a n dxm ≤ 0, such shift in the distribution of θ results in a decrease in
the expected value of trade conditional on it being internal. The overall eﬀect on the total gains from trade
under exchange autonomy and nonintegration is therefore ambiguous.
30supplier streamline its operation. Such an investment also increases the competitiveness of
the supplier in working with other buyers. Here we brieﬂy consider the implications of in-
troducing a cooperative element to the investments in quality by the units. We reformulate
assumption 1 as follows:
Assumption 4
1. Φ(si,sj,m i)=[ ( 1− λ)si + λsj] ∗ x(mi,k).
2. Γ(si,s j,m i,θ)=[ ( 1− λ)si + λsj] ∗ γ (mi,θ).
(1 − λ)sj is the ”selﬁsh” part of unit j’s investment and λsj is the ”cooperative” part.
λ = 0 is the self-investment case. In appendix A.2, it is shown that the analysis of the
previous sections carries over to cooperative investments of this form, provided that λ is
small enough. It is also shown that a small increase in λ has no eﬀect on V M
(EX) but lowers
V NI
(EX) and V E
(EX).
Consider the eﬀect of a small increase in the ”cooperativeness” of investments (an in-
crease in λ) on the optimal organizational form. The interim choice of transfer pricing policy
in an integrated ﬁrm does not change, as it is not aﬀected by the level of investments. By
the second part of lemma 8 then, the change in organizational form is a result of a relative
change in values of nonintegration and mandated internal trade. Following an increase in
λ, V NI
(EX) (k) decreases but V M
(EX) (k) remains constant for every k. Thus mandated trade
is optimal for all values of k for which it was optimal before the change. As investments
become more cooperative we would therefore observe less nonintegration.
The intuition for this result is simple. Whenever external trade is an option, an in-
crease in the cooperativeness of investments has an adverse eﬀect on the units’ incentives
to invest, as it raises the extent to which investment improves the trading partner’s outside
options and bargaining position. It is interesting however to note the diﬀerence with a sim-
ilar exercise in the Property Rights model. There, an increase in cooperativeness of both
parties’ investments has an ambiguous eﬀect on the probability of integration (for details,
see Whinston (2003)).
Finally in the case of pure cooperative investments (λ = 1), the general oﬃce faces a
”time-consistency” problem opposite to the one under pure self investments. It mandates
internal trade in fewer instances (fewer values of k)t h a ni tw o u l dﬁnd optimal ex-ante.
Whereas ex-ante, mandating trade may be beneﬁcial to improve investment incentives, at
31the interim stage investment are sunk, and the beneﬁts of exchange autonomy loom larger.
Integration therefore dominates nonintegration as whenever exchange autonomy is optimal
ex-ante it is also optimal interim.
8 More Elaborate Mechanisms
In the previous discussion, the general oﬃce was restricted to choose between one of two
alternatives: either mandate internal trade or grant the divisions exchange autonomy. While
such policies correspond to common transfer pricing practices observed in ﬁrms, one may
wish to explore the implications of allowing the general oﬃce an additional freedom on this
regard, particularly as both of these policies are suboptimal and do not achieve the interim
ﬁrst-best.
Assume therefore that the general oﬃce can use mechanisms of the type discussed in
Moore and Repullo (Moore and Repullo (1988)) for implementation in complete-information
environments to elicit the realization of the commonly observed state variable θ from the
divisions. Knowing θ, the general oﬃce can then implement the interim ﬁrst-best by man-
dating internal trade if and only if θ ≤ θFB. Given exchange autonomy, when θ>θ FB the
divisions would both choose mi = m and trade externally, as by lemma 6, θE ≤ θFB.E v e n
without resorting to such complex mechanisms, the general oﬃce can implement the interim
ﬁrst-best rather easily, employing the following simple mechanism: With equal probabilities,
one of the divisions is delegated the right to decide whether trade is internal or external.
The division then has to publicly announce its decision which is thereafter implemented.
If trade is internal, the transfer price is determined by bargaining as before. The mecha-
nism is executed at the beginning of the interim stage, prior to the orientation decisions,
(m1,m2). If internal trade is to follow both divisions choose mi = m and otherwise mi = m
for i =1 ,2.




Note that for a symmetric ex-ante choice s1 = s2 = s the inequality above is equivalent to
that for the jointly optimal rule
x(m,k) ≥ γ (m,θ).
Furthermore it can be shown that the choice of investments is symmetric in equilibrium,
similarly to what was shown in section 6.2.
32Note however, and this is the key point, that from an ex-ante perspective, the use of
such a mechanism interim can have a detrimental eﬀect on the incentives to invest. To see
this, suppose that the general oﬃce implements the interim ﬁrst-best using a mechanism






























for i ∈ {1,2}
where terms that do not depend on si are dropped from the agents’ incentive constraints.
Compare this to the non-integration program in (8). For a given level of incentives b1 =




























Now for all θ,
x(m,k)
2 ≤ h(m,θ,k) ≤ h(e m(θ),θ,k). And for θ ≥ θE, γ (m,θ) ≥ h(e m(θ),θ,k)
by deﬁnition. Therefore for every level of incentives, b, investments are higher under non-
integration than under integration. Integration does have the advantage of incentives coor-
dination and here also of eﬃciency over the orientation decisions.
While we would not attempt to directly compare the solutions to the two programs here,
we note a couple of points. First, an increase in the opportunity cost of market orientation,
k, clearly favors integration here, as it lowers the value of a non-integrated organization but
has no eﬀect on that of an integrated one. Second, non-integration can indeed be optimal.
Consider the case of costless market orientation: x(m,k)=1 ,f o ra l lm.I n t h a t c a s e





































We have argued that sNI(b) >s I (b) above. The term in square brackets is bigger
under integration, but the diﬀerence can be made arbitrarily small for particular choice of







for some µ>0a n dε>0 small. Provided that γθ is bounded, for every δ>0, there are
some µ,ε such that the diﬀerence between the two terms is no larger than δ. Under this
conditions, as incentives are more ”productive” under non-integration, the non-integrated
owners would set more powered incentives than the general oﬃce of an integrated ﬁrm.
Consequentially, the joint surplus from integration under non-integration would be larger
as well.17
While costless market orientation is an extreme case (in fact the general oﬃce would do
equally well interim to allow exchange autonomy), a continuity argument implies that this
holds true also for ”close by” cases where market orientation bears a small price (in which
case the general oﬃce would strictly favor using the mechanism interim).
To summarize, the introduction of more complex mechanisms that may be played in
the interim stage, does not change the essence of the results. Non-integration is viable as a
”commitment device”, guaranteeing the incentives of managers to make ex-ante investments,
and is more likely to be observed the less costly the distortion of the orientation decision is.
As the ”conventional” transfer pricing policies are no longer used here, the more elaborate
results obtained in section 6.5 regarding the vertical structure of ﬁrms are no longer relevant
in this setup. The results of this section highlights once again the insights established in
section 5 on the value of ”hierarchial ignorance” in organizations. The general oﬃce may
be worse oﬀ being able to learn the private information held by the division managers, as
by doing so it limits their real authority which, due to the contractual incompleteness, is
essential for their incentives to invest.
17In fact the joint surplus under integration when the use of such mechanisms is feasible can be lower than
in the case where only two transfer policies are considered. Surplus is clearly higher in those cases where
trade was mandated (k>k 1), but may be lower for cases where exchange autonomy is granted (k ≤ k1).
The argument follows similar lines to those used above.
349 Conclusions
In this paper, I have discussed the determinants of vertical organization in a framework that
accounts for some important characteristics of real-world ﬁrms: First, operative decisions
are in the hands of middle managers who are rewarded with incentives contracts based on the
results of their units. Second, managers’ decisions are subject to approval and intervention
by the top management of the ﬁrm, and third managers are better informed regarding the
aﬀairs of their divisions than their superiors in the ﬁrm’s hierarchy. I demonstrated that a
key factor explaining whether a trade occurs within the ﬁrm or on the market is whether the
general oﬃce of an integrated ﬁrm can credibly delegate the choice of trading partners to
the managers of the trading divisions. Whenever such delegation is sustainable, integration
of the trade is beneﬁcial. I show that this is satisﬁed not only under the assumption of
full commitment power, but also, interestingly, if the general oﬃce has no commitment
power at all. In the latter case, asymmetric information within the ﬁrm’s hierarchy on the
values of diﬀerent trading opportunities implies that at the time of trade, the general oﬃce
ﬁnds it optimal to let the divisions choose trading partners, so that proﬁtable opportunities
for trading externally are not foregone. An explanation of the boundaries of the ﬁrm
emerges only when we assume that the general oﬃce retains some limited commitment
power. Speciﬁcally, in the context examined, I have shown that the general oﬃce of the ﬁrm
faces a ”time consistency” problem. It tends to mandate internal trades in more instances
than would have been optimal if full commitment was possible. This has an adverse eﬀect
on the investments taken by the divisions’ managers. Whenever such inconsistency arises, it
may be optimal to have the trade conducted between non-integrated, independent parties.
35AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Assume without loss of generality that s1 >s 2. The proof
builds on the following three lemmas.
Lemma 9 ∃b θ(s1,s 2) such that (m,m) are chosen in equilibrium if and only if θ ≥ b θ(s1,s 2).
Proof. The proof proceeds in several steps:
1. To check if (m,m) is an equilibrium, only deviations to mi = e m(θ) need to be con-
sidered.
For each unit i ∈ {1,2},ad e v i a t i o nt omi < m can only be proﬁtable if trade in the
continuation equilibrium is internal. A deviation to e m(θ) is then optimal if it leads to
internal trade. Suppose then that the optimal deviation that induces internal trade
is to b mi < e m(θ). Optimality of b mi implies that the total gains from internal and
external trade are equal:
six(b mi,k)+sjx(m,k)=siγ (b mi,θ)+sjγ (m,θ),
or else, as h(m,θ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nm for m ≤ e m(θ), trade would also be internal for
a slightly higher mi,a n di’s proﬁts would be larger. But in this case, unit i’s proﬁts
equals its disagreement payoﬀ siγ (b mi,θ), which is smaller than siγ (m,θ).




, such that a proﬁtable deviation
by unit i from (m,m) exists if and only if θ<b θ(si,s j).
A deviation by unit i is proﬁtable given θ if
siγ(m,θ) <




(si + sj)γ(m,θ) <s i [x(e m(θ),k)+γ (e m(θ),θ) − γ(m,θ)] + sjx(m,k). (19)
The term on the left is increasing in θ, as γθ ≥ 0. The derivative with respect to θ of
right-hand side term is, by the envelope theorem,
d[x(e m(θ),k)+γ (e m(θ),θ) − γ(m,θ)]
dθ
= γθ (e m(θ),θ) − γθ(m,θ) ≤ 0,
36since γmθ > 0a n de m(θ) < m. It can also be veriﬁed that given assumption 2,
∀(s1,s 2)a n d∀i ∈ {1,2}, there exists a proﬁtable deviation for θ = θ and there is no




thus exists, such that
a deviation by i ∈ {1,2} is proﬁtable if and only if θ<b θ(si,s j).
3. If s1 >s 2 then b θ(s1,s 2) > b θ(s2,s 1).
F i r s tn o t et h a tb yd e ﬁnition of e m(θ)i n ( 5 ) ,
x(e m(θ),k)+γ (e m(θ),θ) − γ(m,θ) >x(m,k).
Therefore if s1 >s 2 then
s1 [x(e m(θ),k)+γ (e m(θ),θ) − γ(m,θ)] + s2x(m,k)
>s 2 [x(e m(θ),k)+γ (e m(θ),θ) − γ(m,θ)] + s1x(m,k).
Comparing condition (19) above for i =1a n di = 2 then, the left-hand side term is
equal while the right-hand side is larger for i =1 . As the right-hand side term was
s h o w nt ob ed e c r e a s i n gi nθ, this implies that b θ(s1,s 2) > b θ(s2,s 1).
(m,m) is therefore an equilibrium if and only if θ ≥ b θ(s1,s 2).
Lemma 10 ∃e θ(s1,s 2) such that (e m(θ), e m(θ)) is an equilibrium if and only if θ<e θ(s1,s 2).
Proof. A deviation from (e m(θ), e m(θ)) by unit i is proﬁtable given (s1,s 2,θ)i f
siγ(m,θ) >
six(e m(θ),k)+siγ (e m(θ),θ)+sjx(e m(θ),k) − sjγ(e m(θ),θ)
2
. (20)
The net gains from deviation are increasing in θ. To see this, rearrange the condition above
as follows:
si [2γ(m,θ) − x(e m(θ),k) − γ (e m(θ),θ)] − sj [x(e m(θ),k) − γ(e m(θ),θ)] > 0,
and take a derivative of the left-hand side term with respect to θ.T h i se q u a l s
si [2γθ(m,θ) − γθ (e m(θ),θ)]−si (xm + γm)
∂ e m(θ)
∂θ




The second term above equals zero by the deﬁnition of e m(θ). All other terms are positive.





37To compare e θ(s1,s 2)a n de θ(s2,s 1), rewrite the condition for proﬁtable deviation as follows:
si [2γ(m,θ) − γ (e m(θ),θ)] + sjγ(e m(θ),θ) > (si + sj)x(e m(θ),k). (21)
As 2γ(m,θ) − γ (e m(θ),θ) ≥ γ(m,θ) ≥ γ (e m(θ),θ),
s1 [2γ(m,θ) − γ (e m(θ),θ)] + s2γ(e m(θ),θ)
>s 2 [2γ(m,θ) − γ (e m(θ),θ)] + s1γ(e m(θ),θ),
The term on the right in (21) is equal for i =1 ,2, whereas the term on the left is larger
for i = 1. Therefore whenever unit 2 has a proﬁtable deviation so does unit 1. Hence
e θ(s1,s 2) < e θ(s2,s 1), and (e m(θ), e m(θ)) is an equilibrium if and only if θ<e θ(s1,s 2).
Below, the abbreviations b θ1 ≡ b θ(s1,s 2)a n de θ1 ≡ e θ(s1,s 2) would be used at times .
Lemma 11 b θ(s1,s 2) ≤ e θ(s1,s 2).
Proof. First, for every θ,
six(e m(θ),k)+siγ (e m(θ),θ)+sjx(e m(θ),k) − sjγ(e m(θ),θ)
2
≥
six(e m(θ),k)+siγ (e m(θ),θ)+sjx(m,k) − sjγ(m,θ)
2
.
Suppose b θ1 > e θ1 so that siγ(m,b θ1) >s iγ(m,e θ1). As (18) holds with equality for b θ1 and



































































+ sjx(m,k) − sjγ(m,e θ1)
2
,
where the second inequality follows from the ﬁrst claim above. But as the right-hand side
of (18) is decreasing in θ, a contradiction.
The proof of Proposition 1 then follows immediately from the three lemmas above.
38A.2 Cooperative investments
In here, I demonstrate that the analysis of this paper can be extended to cover cooperative
investments. I therefore posit (assumption 4) that the respective values of trade are as
follows:
Φ(si,sj,m i)=[ ( 1 − λ)si + λsj] ∗ x(mi,k),
Γ(si,s j,m i,θ)=[ ( 1 − λ)si + λsj] ∗ γ (mi,θ).
Consider ﬁrst the choice of market orientation (m1,m 2). Unit i ∈ {1,2} is ”in charge” of
an investment of value
e si =( 1− λ)si + λsj.
The analysis of the subgame starting with the choice of market orientation then follows
exactly that of subsection 6.1 for the self-investments case, where si is replaced by e si.T h e
interim decision on the transfer pricing policy is determined by the sign of










which does not depend on the equilibrium investments s1 = s2 = e s(b).
Consider next the choice of investments in the ex-ante stage. Given incentives bi, unit










(1−λ)(x(e m(θ),k)+γ(e m(θ),θ))+λ(x(e m(θ),k)−γ(e m(θ),θ))
2 +
sj























(1 − λ)γ (m,θ)f (θ)dθ
#!
,
where b s(·)i sd e ﬁned in subsection 6.2. Under mandated trade, si is a solution to
max





f (θ)dθ − c(s).
Therefore







39As b s0 > 0, an increase in λ, other things being equal, has no eﬀect on investment under
mandated trade, but lowers investment under exchange autonomy and non-integration.
Finally, we argue that the proof of proposition 2 is still valid for the case of cooperative
investments, provided that λ is small enough. The only part of the proof that has to be
veriﬁed is the comparison between sM and sM, the symmetric equilibrium investments that
would have been chosen under exchange autonomy, given incentives of bM:





















(1 − λ)γ (m,θ)f (θ)dθ
#!
.
For λ =0 ,sM >s M, following the argument made in proposition 2. Therefore as sM is
continuous in λ, there exists a λ such that sM >s M for λ<λ. The rest of the proposition
then holds under this restriction.
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